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I.
Introduction: A Vacuum And A Query
It may appear eccentric to introduce an examination of what neo-liberal 
economic analysis and doctrine have to say on the political economy of war 
with two quotations which are very much not from neo-liberals (nor, for that 
matter, economists). However, the fact is that neo-liberal economics has 
almost nothing to say about the economic consequences and policy implications 
of war and the economics of development more generally has very little more.
In Sub-Saharan Africa this is a remarkably odd state of affairs. In two 
regions: Southern Africa (the SADCC states) and the Horn
(Somalia-Ethiopia-Djibouti-Sudan) war is the largest single economic fact and 
understanding or seeking to influence the political economic dynamics of these 
countries without analysing the economic consequences of war is to say the 
least willful tunnel vision. The same can be said of the Saouri Democratic 
Republic while the political economies of Uganda, Chad and Zaire are warped 
and influenced or dominated by the consequences of past civil and/or regional 
wars and by the very real danger of their rekindling.
This is not a study of militarism nor of conflict/disorder in general but of 
the economic consequences of war or safeguarding against a massive risk of 
war. Riots, strikes and small scale localised conflicts fall outside its 
scope unless directly related to actual or seriously potential civil and/or 
interstate war. In that sense the mealie meal riots on the Zambian copper 
belt are not part of the topic. The apparently much smaller activities of the 
Mshala Gang and low intensity border clashes with and raids by South Africa's 
occupation forces in Namibia are. That is so because real or realistically 
feared Rhodesian South African aggression has created many of the burdens of a 
full scale war. Similarly economic tactics short of overt violence are 
covered if they form (as in the case of RSA) part of a "total strategy" which 
quite clearly does involve actual or seriously threatended potential military 
(including proxy force) action.
A problem arises in arriving at an operational definition of neo-liberalism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic theory and analysis has always treated SSA as 
ultra marginal. With the exception of a limited number of African and foreign 
specialists little serious attention is paid to the contextual application of 
political economic or theoretical economic analysis (or to political economic 
ideology in contextual applied form) to SSA.
The supposed SSA governmental conversion to economic neo-liberalism is much 
more apparent than real. Often it not even that apparent except to a true 
believer or a readily frightened advocate of interventionism. In the first 
place the basic causes of the selective "retreat of the state" turn largely on 
perceived real and political resource constraints. Second, many
pronouncements and some actions are based on two premises: external resources 
are essential to survive and to reconstruct and they will not come in adequate 
amounts unless neo-liberal noises, selective narrowing/consolidation of state 
activity and some contractionist/pricist policies are followed. Third, 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrine is very conservative (neo-liberal?) on 
deficits (budgetary and external). So too, New Economic Policy phases are 
quite market and foreign investment oriented tactically but do not constitute 
capitalist neo-liberalism. Thus Algeria and Angola are arguably pursuing 
parallels of Lenin's NEP or Gorbachev's glasnot/perestroika not neo-liberal 
economics even if in some respects they appear to be to the right of the Fund 
let alone the Bank. Even the present Ghanaian policy could be interpreted as 
NEP plus F'eldmanite investment maximisation with the greater liberalisation
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on tariffs and exchange rates partly contextually enforced by the size and 
openness of the economy and partly by the combined need for, and conditioned 
capacity to secure, substantial net external resource inflows.
Thus the locus classicus of neo-liberalist economics in SSA virtually has to 
be the International Financial Institutions: the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. While also problematic, since the Fund and Bank 
approaches are at best in tension and the Bank is very far from monolithic, 
this is probably the least unsatisfactory basic approach to take. However, it 
is necessary to note its limitations.
The Fund operates on the basis of a monetary macroeconomic demand driven short 
term model. This model does not incorporate, and cannot be directly related 
to, real output, at least not at a disaggregated level. Therefore the basic 
Fund goal is monetary macroeconomic short run adjustment by demand contraction 
and its principle tools are devaluation and credit constriction. In SSA the 
Fund is willing to allow for supply expansion through soft external finance, 
but primarily it sees adjustment as laying the base for subsequent larger 
future external resource inflows, exports and domestic output rather than as 
including them as essentic components of stabilisation per se. The economic 
logic of this is somewhat problematic, its political economic naivety is not.
The Bank operates on the basis of a sectoral and macroeconomic medium term 
production (supply) side model. Its present perception (a political or social 
economic one) is that in SSA growth is a necessary part of both stabilisation 
and adjustment to provide augmented resources to continue the process; to 
convince external supporters to resist "aid/structural adjustment fatigue"; to 
provide domestic incentives; and to avert massive civil disorder and the 
general withering of state authority. As a result the Bank has a more varied 
and articulated set of policy concerns and instrumental demands (suggestions 
is too mild) than the Fund. In respect to trade liberalisation, freeing 
selected prices (the price of labour, of capital, of exports and of imports 
are normally required to be manipulated so that the demands are not for 
laissez faire pricing) and either privatising or operating public sector 
entities/functions as if they were private, it is not so much that the two 
institutions disagree as that the Bank's approach provides a firmer base for 
specific proposals than the Fund's and that the Bank's time frame is 
considerably longer.
There are, between a short term macroeconomic monetary demand constraint 
approach and a medium term real sectoral/macro supply growth one, inevitable 
tensions. In some SSA contexts potentially antagonistic contradictions exist 
between Fund and Bank strategies. Reducing trade and budget gaps (as opposed 
to financing them in sustainable ways) and reducing the constant price levels 
of total bank credit are not consistent with short term growth in severely 
depressed (let alone war-torn) SSA economies. This is independent of whether 
either or neither or both be neo-liberal. The Fund's model long pre-dates 
neo-liberalism and the Bank's present variant is much more eclectic than its 
starting point in the Berg Report would have suggested (or approved).
The last point poses another problematic. The Fund has a history of 
remarkable coherence at any time and over time. This is true even when its 
Articles and probably its dominant members would permit more flexibility and 
more varied approaches. That history can be interpreted as unity of purpose 
and freedom from faddery or as monolithic continuation in past error. The 
Bank is much more varied in approaches and personnel at any time and over 
time. This can be pictured as contextual realism with flexibility and 
pragmatic reading of the lessons of experience or as faddism and expediency 
escaped from a coherent framework or discipline but regularly reined in by the 
lessons of non-success. Nonetheless it is not unreasonable to argue that from 
1980 the Fund and the Bank taken together have been the leading overt heralds, 
tools and pay mobilisers of neo-liberalism in SSA.
II.
Government Expenditure and Its Scope
Neo-liberalism in principle views government expenditure (with the partial 
exception of infrastructural investment which is viewed as a base or 
stock-capital for the private directly productive sector) as a drag on the 
economy, but - up to some point - a necessary one. In general it views both 
current public consumption of goods and services and transfer payments (to 
individuals or, especially, public enterprises) as well beyond that point. 
The state's expenditure is seen as crowding out the enterprise (read private) 
sector in investment and the household in consumption.
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There are in practice limitations or qualifications to this approach. 
Education and health (especially the former) are sometimes viewed as 
investment in labour productivity (stock capital) as, on occasion, is 
accessible pure water. More particularly the nightwatchman law and order 
roles are, with very limited exceptions, viewed as irremediably within the 
proper ambit of the state. Privatisation of security and especially of 
violence is not on the whole a goal of economic neo-liberalism so much as of 
political neo-feudalism and/or quasi-militarism.
In practice neo-liberalism - at the theoretical and often even at the applied 
level - has little concrete to say about state recurrent spending (other than 
subsidies to public and - less vehemently - private enterprises). It does 
tend to play the mirror image of Oliver Twist and say "less" fairly regularly. 
Here, the World Bank is an exception believing many African states public 
recurrent spending is too low absolutely and as a per cent of GDP to provide 
an adequate framework and foundation for directly productive enterprises or a 
stable social fabric. (The ghost of Robert MacNamara's "elimination of 
absolute poverty" still stalks the corridors and sometimes the policies of the 
Bank!) The Bank is not entirely consistent on this stance which appears to 
represent a significant change in perception taking effect from about 1985 and 
amounting to a more cautious and pragmatic variant of the dominant themes of 
its 1970s approach.
Neo-liberalism is nominally concerned with greater efficiency in, and on 
occasion with broader access to, basic public services. (This is of course 
not a distinguishing characteristic.) The 'ormer is frequently used as an 
argument that expenditure cuts can be consistent with enhanced real services - 
true, albeit not within the time frame of an IMF programme. The latter seems 
to turn on targetting both to those in need where feasible and to minimum 
level services to all (in practice not even approximately attained in more 
than a handful of SSA states and for a limited range services in them) with 
anything further paid for by the user. In general neo-liberalism (except when 
tax revenue is below 10% of GDP) opposes higher taxes (and on occasion 
energetic collection of existing ones) but advocates higher fees. To the 
argument that the latter - especially in respect to basic health, education 
and drinking water - are regressive, the arguments are, a.) that in many cases 
(e.g. university education, expensive hospital treatment) the poor almost
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never have access in any event so that subsidisation or free provision is in 
practice regressive and, b. ) that the poor can and do pay now for private 
health care and education and would receive more value for less cost were they 
to pay the fees to public services thus breaking the resource nooses which 
strangle their coverage and quality/efficiency.
The problem in evaluating this case as to general government expenditure in 
SSA is partly that like the curate's egg, it is good in parts, and has the 
support of a somewhat surprising range of non neo-liberals, For example, 
African Ministers of Health and UNICEF agree on fees as a desirable, 
substantial source of finance for primary health care as set out in the 1987 
Bamako Declaration. More basic is that since the Fund tends to say little 
beyond "cut" with a bias against "subsidies" (sometimes defined to include 
financing fixed investment of even profitable public enterprises) any detailed 
examination must turn on World Bank prescriptions. Since 1985 these are 
arguably more Smithian than neo-liberal. A substantial state role set is 
defined (plus mixed sectors with the less poor able to buy more) and very 
considerable stress is placed on increasing the quantity of resources used to 
perform them as well as on the efficiency (somewhat ill-defined albeit roughly 
in quantatative unit cost or social cost/benefit ratio terms) with which they 
are deployed.
III.
Military Spending: Silence And Whispers
In respect to military and related budgets the Fund and the Bank rarely have 
much to say overtly or, in the majority of cases, in camera either. Since 
they are not equally concerned about political neutrality on basic health 
charges, cutting food subsidies on staples or delaying universal primary 
education there must be some other explanation. It probably is that they view 
(not by any means wrongly) defence/security spending as the hardest to control 
or to cut back and attacking it as an effort inefficient way of reducing 
government spending. Further, the Bank's post 1985 peception that adjustment 
which rends the fabric of society is not sustainable clearly applies to 
contexts, processes and measures leading to civil explosions (its locus 
classicus is Zambia) and may be seen as counselling caution on cutting the
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budgets of men with guns lest the result be not fiscal efficiency but a coup. 
If that is the explanation, however, rather more overt analysis of the 
constraints involved would be useful to both national and Bank policy planners 
and negotiators.
However, there have been cases in which it is strongly believed the Bank has 
challenged military spending levels - at least three in the context of war. 
These include Tanzania's solidarity, advanced border defence operation in 
Mozambique over 1986-88; the similar but larger Zimbabwean operation from 1983 
on and the general level of military spending in Morocco. (The Bank almost 
certainly takes the same view in respect to Ethiopia and the Sudan but has not 
had the scope to express it to any point in the first case and probably 
despairs of having any impact if it did in the second.) It may not be
coincidental that the three cases cited all relate primarily to spending in 
respect to a war outside the countries' borders (albeit in two cases clearly a 
defensive one).
IV.
War As An Economic Actor - Terra Incognita
Neo-liberalism in general and the World Bank more specifically do pay marginal 
attention to military expenditure, albeit less than to some other categories.
However, they do not analyse war as a major exogenous (whether civil or
external) variable with major and complex local, sectoral and macroeconomic 
political and political economic content.
The fact is clear enough. World Bank studies on Tanzania allude in passing to 
the cost of the war pursuant on Amin's 1978 invasion and those on Zimbabwe to 
costs of creating a national defence capacity and of defending transport 
routes in Mozambique. Pre-1988 Mozambique studies mention the war there three 
to five times with no analysis and perhaps one quarter per cent of the space 
in the main country report and later ones while looking at some consequences 
in an ad hoc manner still neither analyse coherently nor seek to consider how 
the causes may contrain remedial action vis a vis a specific symptoms. The 
recent Angolan studies do mention war more frequently and make a stab at 
highlighting the burden of the defence bill on the budget but still en
passant. War is very much "noises offstage" (like Fortinbras in Hamlet) not a 
lead actor.
One would not realise from this treatment that in the absence of war Tanzania 
would probably have had a 2 to 3? per annum higher GDP growth rate from 1979 
onward or that Zimbabwe would have a negative domestic government borrowing 
requirement on combined recurrent and capital cost. Nor could the casual
reader intuit that Mozambique's actual GDP is less than half the level it 
would probably have achieved had the 1979-81 lull in RSA aggression continued 
or that the very marked contrast between managerial and technical capability 
in defence and civil institutions in Angola suggests that a not insignificant 
portion of the skilled personpower and civil institutional capacity noose in 
that country is the direct result of war.
Why this reticence to face the obvious? Treating war as a one line 'given' 
without any further articulation or analysis is not typical of the way other 
major exogenous events - e.g. drought, terms of trade shifts are treated. Nor 
is it self-evident that analysing the direct and indirect articulated economic 
and political economic impact of war is inherently 'political' or
'interference'. (In any event the Bank does not shrink from 'interference' 
with, or at least comments on, other policies.) One possible explanation is 
that war economics - even in capitalist economies - tends in large part to be 
the economics of intervention, rationing other than by price and
administrative dictat. Modern wars are not run on laissez faire economic 
bases (albeit defence budgets sometimes appear to be!). Therefore, 
neo-liberals and the World Bank may feel both a lack of expertise as to war 
economics and a feeling that to admit the magnitude of war impact would reopen 
the door for state economic interventionism on a basis it would find harder to 
challenge.
Further it is true that analysing civil wars or conflicts with neighbouring 
states in detail is very hard to do without appearing to make normative 
judgements about the conflicts themselves. Understandably the Bank and the
Fund wish to avoid placing themselves in that position.
This is not to say that the Fund and Bank oppose emergency war damage offset 
and human survival of war victims programmes. Their general attitude to them 
is benevolent. But both view them as somehow extra-economic and at best
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parallel to stabilisation, recovery, structural adjustment and renewed 
development. They do not involve themselves in their planning or funding nor 
seek to view survival, rehabiliation and reintegration into production and 
adjustment for renewed growth and development as an integrally interlocking 
continuum.
That of course is not unique to war. The criticism applies to disaster relief 
- bilateral and multilateral as a whole. Rehabilitation components 
(especially reintegrating pauperised people into production and society) are 
regularly under-analysed and under-funded. Or as a disaster relief wing team 
leader from one agency put it to people trying to get him to finance 
rehabilitation and vulnerability reduction: "You do not understand. That is 
development. Disaster is our bread and butter." No ill-will was intended but 
so long as disaster relief (including war relief) is viewed in that 
perspective there will be plenty of bread and butter for its purveyors but not 
for the victims they - quite genuinely - seek to serve.
In fairness neo-liberals and the Bank are not alone. Sectoral and 
macroeconomic studies of war impact and ramification in SSA are few and far 
between. A handful have emerged in respect to Southern Africa (and to a 
lesser extent South Africa and Namibia) from the mid-1980s. Even national 
governments - judging by their budget speeches, economic reviews and published 
plans do not give serious attention to war as a major economic 
parameter/variable. Since 1985 Mozambique has become something of an 
exception to this generalisation as, less clearly, has Angola. In some cases 
the states do not seem to realise the full economic impact of war - e.g. 
Tanzania; in others they have tended to view it as beyond economic 
intervention and therefore not needing detailed applied economic analysis - 
e.g. Zimbabwe; in some the need to relate the economic and military fronts of 
war to achieve efficiency on either has been overlooked - e.g. pre-1985 
Mozambique. In still others the general principle of preserving security in 
relation to war activities seems to have come to encompass analysis of its 
articulated economic impact - e.g. Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia and probably 
Morocco; while in a last group the capacity for analysis and the data to 
analyse are so limited that adding a new 'sector' may be virtually impossible, 
e.g. Sudan, Uganda, Chad. Perhaps a mix of these factors plus an absence of
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focussed academic or international agency economic concern with the field is 
the basic explanation in most cases.
Whatever the cause, the result is unsound. War is among the major exogenous 
economic factors which has affected SSA adversely since at least the 1970s 
and especially since 1980. Indeed it probably has caused GDP and forex 
availability for non-military imports losses since 1980 substantially greater 
than those of drought and comparable to those from terms of trade declines.
For about 16 countries: Angola, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Malawi,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, the Sudan, the Saouri Republic, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and arguably the Republic of South Africa and 
Libya, war (external or civil and including preventative defence against a 
real danger of war) is the largest exogenous economic variable. (Arguably in 
the cases of Ethiopia, Morocco, the Sudan and a fortiori South Africa, war is 
at least substantially politically endogenous but not economically.) Other 
states have been similarly affected in the past notably Mauretania, Nigeria, 
Burundi, Uganda and Zaire and in at least the last case are likely again to be 
so affected. 21 countries out of 53 (50 0AU members plus Morocco, Namibia and 
South Africa) African states (18 of 47 in Sub-Saharan Africa treating the 
Saouri Republic as North African) is a substantial proportion of states and 
they account for majorities of population and GDP.
A closer examination of the economic impact of war in SSA is therefore 
appropriate on purely economic analysis and economic policy informing grounds.
This is independent of the fact that the main applied purpose of several of 
the extant studies has clearly been to mobilise international pressure against 
South Africa's regional strategy of aggression and destabilisation and/or to 
mobilise external resource flows to offset some of the costs of the victims of 
that strategy and its praxis.
V.
Economic Components of War Costs
The most evident and cited aspects of war costs are military expenditure above 
some minimum 'normal' threshold (say 5 % of budget in many cases) and/or their
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foreign exchange content. Less frequently direct war damage is cited.
However, these would appear to be only two of eight components of
macroeconomic war cost:
1. excess military expenditure (including deterrent and solidarity heads) 
and especially its foreign exchange content;
2. direct war damage (including non-military aspects such as destruction of 
roads by military vehicles and physical disruption of non-military 
production by infrastructural or logistical damage);
3. non-maintenance of non-replacement of capital stock as a result of 
limited financial or foreign exchange resources consequential on war 
costs;
the multiplier (or divider) impact of the three previous items on 
non-military GDP especially in the presence of severe budgetary and/or 
foreign exchange constraints;
5. economic spill-over costs - e.g. transport blockages or cost increases 
and refugee inflows - from wars in adjacent countries;
6. the shock impact of a large, sudden leap in war costs (analagous in 
macroeconomic terms to a severe deterioration in the terms of trade or a 
major drought) on fragile macroeconomic systems;
7. strategic and policy distraction, i.e. the simple facts that during a 
major war it is not possible to focus government attention on medium (or 
sometimes even short), term macro and sectoral economic strategy, policy 
and implementation and also that - in a serious war context - military 
expenditure is harder to control than any other category;
8. Priority allocation of skilled, trained personnel (especially managerial 
and technical) to military institutions significantly limiting the scope 
and efficiency of the civil sectors.
The relative importance of these cost categories varies widely as do their
levels (singly or together) relative to GDP. Each is significant in some SSA
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economies and at least the first and fourth in a majority.
The first point presumably does not require illustration nor does the literal 
military destruction component within the second. However, the damage to 
roads of military traffic (especially tracked vehicles), the dislocation of 
actual production or transport of both agricultural and industrial output as 
well as of basic rural services and the cost to production of diverting scarce 
high and middle level personpower to war are often passed by. The first two 
were very significant in Tanzania/Uganda and perhaps to a somewhat lesser 
extent in Nigeria/Biafra, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. They are at 
their highest in Mozambique/South Africa and Angola/South Africa in which, as 
a result of destruction and dislocation GDP in Mozambique and non-oil GDP in 
Angola have been cut by at least 50% below counterfactual peacetime levels and 
dislocation has been even more crushing than literal destruction. The 
personnel cost was particularly evident in Rhodesia where all white males were 
full or part-time soldiers and is so in Angola where the high technological 
and managerial capacity of many military institutions contrasts sharply with 
those of the social and non- hydro-carbon economic sectors; but must be severe 
in any case in which a substantial number of artisans, professionals and 
managers have to be reallocated to the armed forces and their support 
facilities.
Non-maintenance and non-replacement of fixed assets over 197^—79 (and to a 
lesser extent 1965-73) by Rhodesia, primarily because of the war and sanctions 
scissors effect on foreign exchange available for non-military imports has 
imposed very heavy burdens on Zimbabwe. Because the domestic financial
constraints were less severe, maintenance and replacement of low import 
content assets was largely kept up so that the deferred cost manifested itself 
in an explosive rise of the investment imports/Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
ratio in the four years after independence. The Nacala-Malawi railway is an 
even more extreme case. Completed by Portugal at the end of the 1960s (as the 
liberation war in Mozambique reached a high level of intensity albeit rarely 
directly disrupting the line) it was nearly non-functional over much of its 
length by 1980. The reason was that line of rail and rolling stock
maintenance and replacement was near nil throughout the decade because of both 
budgetary and foreign exchange constraints imposed by war successively on the 
Portuguese colonial regime and on the independent Mozambican governments.
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Spill Over Costs: Dislocation of People and Production
Spill-over costs of adjacent wars have three main aspects - military 
incursions, transport or other cost raising dislocations and refugee flows. 
The first is included in precautionary and deterrent military expenditure but 
not the second or third. Several major examples are Southern African and
result from South Africa's systematic destruction - directly and by proxy
forces - of Angola and Mozambican transport routes. For Zimbabwe, Malawi, 
Zambia and Zaire this has resulted in very sharp increases in freight costs 
(reflected in lower fob prices for exports and higher cif prices for imports) 
because they are forced to use more distant ports - primarily East London and 
Durban in South Africa. Semi-official cost estimates for Zimbabwe and Malawi 
each exceed $100 million a year (on some estimates approach $150 million) and 
the total for Zaire and Zambia together may be of the same order of magnitude. 
In the case of Malawi this cost represents about 30 to 50$ of export earnings. 
As a result the macroeconomic cost of war is very heavy despite there being a 
small army and no significant combat. Indeed Malawi arguably, could best
reduce its war costs by totally interdicting MNR forces transitting its 
territory to attack Mozambique and acting jointly with Mozambique to defend 
the corridor to its natural ports of Nacala and Beira. Since December 1986, 
Malawi has taken substantial steps toward such a strategy.
Refugee flows from major wars have been a particularly heavy burden for the 
Sudan, Somalia, Malawi and - during the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe independence war - 
Zambia. War, expulsion of aliens, drought and economic disaster have driven 
refugees to a majority of SSA states. In the absence of other significant war 
costs they do not usually represent a crippling burden at macroeconomic level 
although in Malawi where their numbers exceed of the domestic population
they do constitute a massive economic burden even taken alone. They do, 
however, represent a major human cost of war.
The Macro-economic Implications of Shock and Distraction
The multiplier effect is a widely used macroeconomic tool whose relevance to 
any autonomous decrease in supply or increase in non-productive demand should 
require no explanation. However, it has to date very rarely been applied to
direct war costs in SSA. Given marginal import/GDP ratios and the dislocative 
impact of war expenditure fuelled inflation on production generally, and the 
external balance (or more accurately imbalance) in particular, an estimate of 
total GDP loss (or at any rate non-defence GDP loss) of the order of three to 
five times war foreign exchange costs does not appear to be an unreasonable 
starting point. In the case of Angola and Mozambique estimates on this basis 
for 1980-88 tend to confirm - at least as to order of magnitude - estimates 
built up from direct war costs and specified consequential production losses 
and those based on counterfactual projections of GDP growth in the absence of 
war.
Shock impact has been relatively less explored in macroeconomic analysis of 
SSA economies. It has, however, been increasingly seen as significant both in 
relation to major natural disasters (e.g. Sahel droughts) and sudden, massive 
negative terms of trade movements. The basic proposition is that, beyond some 
level, increased resource (or reduced supply) and policy demands become 
unmanageable and macroeconomic term strategy and policy deteriorate into an 
increasingly fragmented and short term series of measures to postpone disaster 
until something (good) turns up. War is particularly likely to have this 
effect - especially as over-optimism as to the likely duration and level of 
war costs, as well as underestimation of indirect costs, appears to be
endemic, e.g. in Tanzania, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Strategic and policy distraction from macroeconomic concerns, once stated, is 
presumably both self-explanatory and unlikely to be challenged as to existence 
even if arguable as to degree. The history of Rhodesian policy as the 
liberation war grew certainly is one of decreasing ability to pay coherent
attention to non-military issues or to contain military spending. The lag in 
Tanzanian strategic response to the 1978 export price collaspse (in contrast 
to its very rapid response to 1973-7^ oil and drought shocks) relates directly 
to the distraction of the 1978-79 concentration on military issues flowing 
from Amin's invasion and the subsequent (not very successful) efforts to 
provide a security frame within which Ugandans could reconstruct their policy. 
While probably less true on the strategy and policy front (though not the
military budget one), the same challenge has confronted Zimbabwe since 1981 
and especially since the buildup of its solidarity and transport defence
forces in Mozambique began in 1983.
Human Costs - Lives and Misery
Analagous constricted vision and underestimation of costs has characterised 
the human price of war. Combat and crossfire civilian deaths are the only 
regularly mentioned aspect with the exception of the six Southern African 
studies alluded to earlier and in particular of the UNICEF reports. It is 
possible to identify six main aspects or components of costs:
1. direct military/combatant casualties, including militias and 
semi-organised forces;
2. civilian casualties including crossfire victims as well as those
massacred by terrorist tactics, killed in selective sabotage attacks and
falling victim to unselective over-reaction by government and/or invader 
or insurrectionist forces;
3. victims of increased mortality - especially infants and young children -
resulting from destruction or breakdown of health and pure water services 
as a direct or indirect effect of war;
victims of starvation resulting from war caused dislocation of food
production or blocking of relief food distribution;
5. non-lethal human costs of directly war caused dislocation of people,
production and services;
6. the multiplier (divider) effect on production, incomes and access to
basic services.
As with macroeconomic costs, the absolute and relative significance of these 
components vary widely but all have been at very high levels in five or more
SSA states. Military and combatant casualties are in fact usually a small
proportion of war related deaths - under 5% in Angola and Mozambique and 2% in 
Tanzania. Genuinely accidental crossfire victims are probably an even smaller 
proportion.
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Terrorist tactic victims are much more numerous in some wars - notably 
Mozambique and Angola/South Africa but also the Ugandan, Chadian and Sudanese 
civil wars. Terrorist tactics are here defined as attacks on human or 
material targets designed to cause fear and dislocation, to wipe out highly 
valued services (e.g. health posts, schools, shops, local transport) and their 
staff and/or to use enforced starvation as a political weapon. Their goal is 
killing the dream of development and undermining perceived legitimacy by 
reducing both service and security provision. Their direct military or 
economic impact is totally secondary. In other terminology they are aimed at 
"soft targets". Over-reaction by combatant forces is very common - especially 
when acquiescence in the presence of forces hostile to those entering or 
controlling an area from fear is hard to differentiate from willed cooperation 
and/or the area is perceived as basically hostile by the forces in question.
The largest single war related death toll, especially in the case of combat 
within a country, is usually increased infant and under 5 mortality related to 
direct destruction of health services, their immobilisation or inaccessibility 
as a result of combat or human dislocation and their deterioration because of 
war claims on fiscal and foreign exchange resources. For Angola and 
Mozambique over 1980—88 carefully constructed estimates in the UNICEF studies 
total 800,000 war related infant and young child deaths, now running one every 
four minutes or, as UNICEF Executive Director James Grant put it, comparable 
to crashing a fully-loaded jumbo jet of under fives daily. Even in Tanzania 
where the mortality deterioration (relative to pre-1978 trends) is the result 
of the divider effect of war deepened macroeconomic malaise, the 1979-88 death 
toll certainly exceeds 25,000 souls and may be up to 125,000. War related 
increases in older child and adult mortality - except for mass starvation - 
are significant but significantly smaller (and harder to estimate) than for 
infants and young children because older children and adults (except the aged 
or already infirm) are less physically vulnerable.
Mass starvation because of destruction of crops, dislocation of farmers, armed 
intervention to prevent food distribution and the divider effect on food 
imports capacity have killed several hundred thousand Africans over the past 
two decades. Usually but not always (e.g. Mozambique over 1986/87 where
3,500,000 to 4,000,000 million human beings were known to be in danger of 
severe malnutrition or literal starvation despite relatively favourable 
weather compared with up to 5,000,000 in 1987/88 when some provinces suffered
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from drought) unfavourable climatic conditions have been a catalytic factor. 
The vast majority of the victims have been Angolans, Mozambicans, Sudanese, 
Ethiopians/Eritreans/Somalis, Chadians, Biafrans, Nigerians, South Sudanese 
and West Nile and Karamojang Ugandans. Except for Somali refugees from 
Ethiopia in Somalia camps and Ugandan and Ethiopian/Eritrean refugees in the 
Sudan, all of these cases involve bitter, long duration wars (whether civil or 
externally generated) within the country experiencing famine.
Dislocation - of up to half the rural populations of Angola, Mozambique and 
the Southern Sudan and perhaps over a quarter in Chad and Uganda, - has high 
human costs at the non-lethal level. Refugees from war - as from drought - 
have usually lost literally everything: home, land, household equipment, tools 
and seeds, livestock, access to public services. Even if they survive, they 
are in abject poverty and frequently unable even to begin reconstructing their 
lives and household incomes without substantial direct and infrastructural 
support. War makes the resources for adequate levels of such support quite 
literally unavailable for more than a small minority. Security concerns (of 
the dislocated human being and/or of the state) may force those dislocated to 
remain in overcrowded or agriculturally unsuitable areas because there they 
may have some protection while if they returned to their homes they would have 
none.
Trans-border refugees are conceptually and humanly an extreme case of 
dislocation, e.g. of over seven million displaced Mozambicans somewhat over 
one million have fled to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland and the Republic 
of South Africa. There are practical differences: they may be in greater 
danger of expulsion back into the combat zone (e.g. Mozambicans in South 
Africa); they cannot fully begin rehabilitation of their lives and livelihoods 
until they are able to return home (as most Zimbabwe refugees in Zambia did 
after independence) or decide, and are allowed, to integrate into the host 
country (as 100,000 Rwandais and Burundians have in Tanzania); because of the 
international definition of refugee they may receive more international 
assistance than refugees (dislocated people) in their own country.
The divider effect of macroeconomic war costs applies to the dislocated and to 
other citizens of severely war affected countries. Access to basic services 
deteriorates (as does their quality), inputs and markets for production shrink 
as do job opportunities and goods to buy. The percentage of households in
absolute poverty rises. These human costs can be very marked even in an 
economy which has had very little combat within its territory - e.g. Tanzania.
It may need underlining that the cessation of hostilities or major external 
threats does not bring macroeconomic or human war costs to an end immediately. 
Nor does it do so even after the armed forces are cut back to 'normal' 
personnel and expenditure levels - by no means a quick or easy exercise as 
post civil war Nigeria and 1980-82 Zimbabwe illustrate. The cumulative impact 
on the economy continues to exist until at the least the past direct and 
divider war costs no longer prevent normal growth of exports, basic services 
and GDP or - logically - until recovery has restored these to the levels they 
would have attained in the absence of war. Even under favourable external and 
domestic conditions the former can take several years and the latter over a 
decade. At worst - as illustrated by Uganda - it may be virtually impossible 
to make and to sustain a stabilisation, adjustment and recovery strategy for 
up to a decade after the end of the actual war (in that case the initial war 
as internal peace has yet to be fully restored).
VI.
War In Southern Africa: South Africa's Total Regional Strategy
The regional impact of war in Southern Africa has been studied somewhat more 
than other cases and is absolutely the largest. Therefore, a brief regional 
review is in order. Further, a sub-regional perspective is necessary both 
because the external cause of the wars - South Africa's "total strategy' - is 
common and because a substantial amount of military and political as well as 
of economic coordination in defence from and - at least politically and 
economically - counter-offence against South African strategy and tactics have 
been regional through the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and their political economic affiliate the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (FLS members plus 
Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland). However, the nature and economic consequences of 
war in the region are by no means uniform with actual fighting dominantly in 
two states and economic burdens overwhelming in the same two, very severe in 
four more and secondary to low in the other three.
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South Africa's regional strategy has sought to make the Southern African 
region both safe and profitable for apartheid. Both are security 
considerations but the possible methods for pursuing them are not merely not 
identical but possibly contradictory. Full scale open war and trade are not 
necessarily compatible (Angola) and full scale economic destabilisation by 
military as well as economic, means, is not compatible with high and expanding 
trade volumes (Mozambique) whereas highly lucrative and growing trade and 
investment require some limitation on economic damage done and impose some 
constraint on the frequency and scope of overt military (even by proxy force) 
operations (Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe). In addition, actions taken against 
one state may devastate the economy of another in a way which is damaging to 
the profitability goal even if it produces some side economic benefits 
(Malawi).
The main instruments of South African military aggression have been:
a. direct overt use of RSA armed forces against the victim state - primarily 
in respect to Angola;
b. limited use of RSA armed forces for terror raids nominally and sometimes 
actually against African National Congress personnel but with wider 
psycho-military goals - in seven of the states but for distance reasons 
not Angola or Tanzania;
c. similar long distance sabotage operations - with or without proxy force 
involvement - notably Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe;
d. Use of proxy forces organised, trained, supplied, financed and often 
supported by key RSA/mercenary personnel - massively in Angola (armed 
rebels/"UNITA") and Mozambique (armed bandits/"Renamo") and to a lesser 
extent in Lesotho ("Lesotho Liberation Army"), Zambia ("Mashala Gang") 
and Zimbabwe ("Super Zanu");
e. Manipulation of domestic armed forces to achieve political change - 
Lesotho;
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f. Threatening to use any or all of these tactics - thereby creating a need
for massive defence expenditure to deter or limit the impact of the
threatened action.
The first, fourth and sixth of these measures are the most economically 
damaging. The first and fourth have been concentrated against Angola and 
Mozambique where the key goals have been destruction of key economic 
facilities - especially those providing transit traffic routes for the five 
core landlocked states (Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) - 
and mass terrorism to destroy the rural economy, isolate the towns and create 
massive refugee/dislocated person populations. The sixth by itself is not 
economically devastating albeit it has crippled Tanzanian and Zambian efforts 
at recovery, severely reduced Zimbabwe's growth rate and slowed the buildup of 
Botswana's external assets.
The selectivity in the use of large scale, overt military action creating
economic devastation appears to have been deliberate - Botswana, Zambia and
probably Zimbabwe could have been crippled economically just as readily 
(indeed more so in the first two cases) as Angola and Mozambique. Blocking 
the non-South African routes of the core landlocked states to the sea and 
concentrating their attention and budgets on static defence against military 
threats was seen as sufficient to prevent their acting against South Africa 
and consistent with expanding captive or semi-captive markets for goods and 
services as well as creating new transport markets (and leverage over economic 
policy) by replacing the severed Angolan and Mozambican links.
Through 1986 the combined strategy clearly worked reasonably well from a South 
African perspective except to the extent it was seriously expected to reduce 
black resistance in RSA itself. Trade with the SADCC states (dominated by 
manufactured exports which have been crucial to the expansion of the 
manufacturing sector) grew rapidly. Vulnerability of the landlocked states - 
despite their individual and regional efforts, especially at alternative 
transport route rehabilitation - increased. Together with the devastation 
(economic, social and military) of Angola and Mozambique, the increased 
dependence ensured that there was no serious security threat to RSA from 
within the Southern African region. To this broad pattern of success there 
were three limitations. The Angolan adventure had grown from a forward 
defence of Namibia to a much larger, more costly and open-ended venture
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without halting the deterioration of the economic, political or even military 
position of RSA in the occupied territory. Increased transport costs and 
refugee flows undermined the economy of Malawi. Most important perhaps, the 
war bill (economic, foreign exchange, budgetary, human and political) was 
large and may well have reduced South Africa's economic growth from 1980 by 1 
to 2 % a year while also increasing the growing tendency of external 
enterprises and governments to distance themselves from it economically.
Over 1987 and especially 1988 the strategy has worked much less well in its 
own terms. Indeed as 1988 ended it was arguably, at least in its 1981 —86 
form, in ruins. Militarily the Mozambican proxy force had been broken even 
though remaining deadly as a terrorist presence and the military position for 
South Africa - and potentially the UNITA proxy force - in Angola had become 
militarily untenable. Transport rehabilitation was nearing the point at which 
dependence of RSA routes would become secondary. The region had managed to 
return to to 3% to average growth rates. Regional commitment to economic 
disengagement (and external support for it) far from being broken had risen 
and begun to show results. The war bill to RSA had continued to rise and the 
low to no growth trend of 1981 — 1988 looked to be an increasing threat to 
domestic security.
VII.
War In Southern Africa: The Price of Pretoria
There are three basic ways of estimating war costs. The first is to make up a 
list of items. In the case of the SADCC economies these include direct war 
damage, extra defence spending, higher transport costs (e.g. Malawi to Durban 
or Port Elizabeth as opposed to Nacala or Beira), loss of transport revenue 
(on routes damaged or closed by South African and proxy action), higher energy 
costs (e.g. South African vs Cahora Basa power), looting and smuggling 
(basically from Southern Angola), destruction of exports from destabilisation 
directly or indirectly preventing production (e.g. in terrorised rural areas) 
or transport (e.g. from Moatize colliery), support for domestic displaced 
persons and international refugees, trade boycotts and embargoes (overt or 
covert) by South Africa, excess costs of South African goods and refusal to 
renegotiate inequitable trading arrangements, loss of existing production
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(consequential on war damage), loss of growth (from diversion of resources 
from new investment to military, relief and reconstruction spending).
SADCC's estimate for these costs over 1980-84 came to $10,120 million and a 
revision by Carol Thompson and R. H. Green to $12,940 million. Carried 
through 1986 in UNICEF's Children On The Front Line they came to $25,120 and 
$27,240 million respectively. Through 1988 the total on this basis is of the 
order of $44,000 - 46,940 million on a basically historic price basis and over 
$50,000 million on a 1988 price one. Defence spending and lost economic 
growth are the dominant heads with war damage, transport and energy costs, 
refugee relief and existing production losses also significant are export 
losses (including transit traffic) for Mozambique and, outside the petroleum 
sector, Angola.
The chief problem with this approach is that it is likely to produce double 
counting, e.g. among loss of exports and production losses and also gaps with 
underestimation of indirect effects from inadequate coverage of lost growth. 
While all of the heads can be estimated as to orders of magnitude none is 
really subject to precise calculation and several (e.g. excess defence 
spending, loss of output from new investment) depend on somewhat problematic 
estimates (e.g. non-war basic defence budgets, normal incremental 
capital/output ratios).
A second method is to compute estimated non-war growth rates for gross 
domestic product and compare them with actual outturns. In Children On The 
Front Line this produced estimates of $5,500 million for Mozambique and 
$13,000 million for Angola over 1980-86 in 1986 prices assuming non-war growth 
rates of 5$ and 8% respectively allowing for substantial recovery in 
Mozambique (in progress from 1979 but cut short by the escalation of proxy 
terrorism and sabotage in 1981) and the petroleum sector led growth plus 
recovery of other sectors Angola could have achieved in the absence of 
continued South African aggression over 1976-80 and its escalation from 1981.
The Children On The Front Line regional total of $25,000 - 30,000 million over 
1980-86 includes $5,000 - 8,000 million for the other 7 SADCC states
calculated on a modified list basis. This total is somewhat misleadingly 
similar to the 1986 list total of $25,000 - 28,000 million. The list
includes, while the GDP calculation excludes, loss of capital stock except
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insofar as it is reflected in current production losses and expenditure with 
some GDP impact (e.g. refugee relief, military salaries and local purchases) 
represents a shift in actual GDP makeup not a direct loss of GDP. The 
similarity of the two figures therefore tends to confirm orders of magnitude 
implying either gaps in the list estimation or too high non-war growth rates 
assumption in the GDP calculation.
As of the end of 1988 on a GDP loss basis - on an alternative scenario 
projection basis for Angola and Mozambique and on a less comprehensive basis 
using foreign exchange costs and production multipliers for the other states - 
was of the order of $60,000 million at 1988 prices or about twice achieved 
GDP. The impact on regional growth was to reduce it as of the 1986-88 period 
from a probable peace time rate of 5 to 6% to an actual 2 to 3%, i.e. from up 
to 3% above to 1$ below population growth. In short in the absence of war 
waged against it by South Africa the SADCC region would have had far less 
serious output declines in the early 1980s and far more marked and sustainable 
recoveries in the mid and late 1980s even had all other factors remained 
unchanged.
It must be stressed that the end of South African aggression would not end 
this stream of losses, only reduce it. Even on the list approach the largest 
component is now loss of potential growth. While peace, ability to cut 
defence costs and access to lower cost transport routes and import sources 
could - if backed by rehabilitation support - restore regional growth to a 5 
to 6/( annual trend rate that would not alter the fact that the base level 
would be at least $10,000 million lower. Therefore an annual loss of $500 to 
$600 million would continue to accrue indefinitely - a different order of 
magnitude entirely from $10,000 million a year however.
Human Cost Of War
The economic damage described above itself entails widespread and severe human 
costs. The standard of living of a majority of the people of the SADCC states 
is very close to or below the absolute poverty line. Were current GDP 25% 
higher and growing at 5 to 6? a year, the numbers in absolute poverty and/or 
lacking access to basic education, health and water services would be 
substantially lower. However, war - as waged by South Africa - has three even
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more telling impacts: loss of food security, massive displacement of people 
and death.
Proxy and regular South African military force attacks have not seriously 
sought to set up new South African installed governments - with brief 
exceptions in Angola in 1975 and possibly Mozambique in 1986. Their 
activities have focussed on sabotage aimed at specific (usually transport and 
power) targets, on mass terrorism designed to destroy governmental authority 
and rural production and on smaller, briefer murder raids and kidnappings by 
RSA's own forces. While financed, supplied, planned, directed and often led 
by South Africa the first two aspects have been carried out primarily by South
African proxy forces notably the armed bandits of Renamo in Mozambique and
Unita in Angola but also the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho, so-called 
Super-Zapu in Zimbabwe, and smaller gangs in Zambia. Renamo has also
attempted terror operations in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe with very limited 
success except in parts of the Zimbabwe border area with Mozambique and - more 
successfully until late 1986 - sought to coerce the government of Malawi into 
not taking effective steps to bar the use of its country by South
Africa/Renamo as a transit and resupply base.
The terrorism has aimed at and resulted in keeping rural populations in 
Mozambique and Angola on the move, unable to settle down to restore 
production. The results have included massive food shortages resulting from 
production shortfalls of up to 1,500,000 tonnes of grain a year. The economic 
consequences of war (exacerbated in the case of Angola by the 1986 petroleum 
price collapse) have prevented commercial imports being substituted while food 
aid to the two states has never exceeded 600,000 tonnes a year and - because 
of transport sabotage and rural terrorism - has proved very difficult to 
distribute.
Further about half the populations of Angola and Mozambique - 14,000,000 souls 
- have been driven out of their homes at least once usually with virtually 
total loss of all possessions and often of the lives of some family members. 
About 1,500,000 are now international refugees, 4,000,000 registered rural 
displaced persons with no significant ability to restore their production and 
incomes, up to 2,000,000 urban migrants largely in slum or shanty areas with 
very low incomes, and about 7,000,000 nominally again self-supporting, 
unlocateable because of the degree of rural dislocation or held as slave
-25-
labour by the armed bandits. The reason that in Mozambique the 1987-88
breaking of most armed bandit units has raised the number of displaced persons 
and refugees (500,000 now in Malawi alone) was the escape of slave labour from 
Renamo control - a situation documented in USAid's Gersony Report. It is 
noteworthy that the armed bandits do not carry out basic service provision or 
food relief operations (they destroy services, killing, maiming or driving out 
personnel as prime targets and steal or destroy food). No one flees to them, 
rather large numbers cross borders or take refuge in government controlled
urban or less insecure rural areas. That in itself is adequate comment on the 
Renamo and Unita claims to be liberation movements with popular bases rather 
than what they are - proxy South African terrorist and sabotage forces.
By the end of 1986 UNICEF estimated - apparently underestimated - the numbers 
dead as a result of South Africa's war of aggression as 1,000,000 souls in 
Mozambique and Angola. Half were infant and under 5 year old child victims 
of war-caused malnutrition and the destruction (or budgetary and import 
constrained) health services. Another 200,000 were famine victims and 100,000 
older child and adult victims of medical service collapse and the interaction 
of malnutrition with not otherwise fatal diseases. The 200,000 estimate for 
direct civilian and military war victims is shown by the Gersony estimate of
100.000 in Mozambique alone over 19 8 6 -8 7 to be an underestimate. A 
conservative re-estimation through 1986 would be at least 325,000 (200,000 in 
Mozambique and 125,000 in Angola). War related deaths over 1987-88 can be 
estimated as of the order of 500,000 (325,000 infants and young children, 
50-75,000 older health and malnutrition victims, 125,000 war casualties) for a 
1980-88 death toll of 1 ,900,000 human beings now dead who would have been 
alive in the absence of war.
That figure relates to Angola and Mozambique alone. In the other seven states 
direct calculation is less easy. In several - but not all cases - war costs
have enfeebled the economy and the budget to an extent eroding food security
as well as medical and water services. A cautious estimate of these deaths 
plus those of terror raids and limited proxy terrorism might be 25,000 -
100.000 over 1980 -8 8 depending primarily on how much war costs have eroded the 
basic health care systems of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia.
As with the economic costs, ending South African aggression can - especially 
in the short run - only reduce human costs. Rehabilitating health and water
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services and restoring rural production and livelihoods is a task which will 
require at least five years of peace and the reversal of the negative infant 
and child mortality trends and bringing their levels down to those pertaining 
in other low income SSA countries, will take yet longer. However, by the 
second year of peace the death toll could be halved and by the fifth reduced 
by perhaps 80? assuming priority attention to food security, mass 
immunisation, access to pure water and basic health care services.
Policy Implications - Domestic, Regional And Global
The level of the price of Pretoria to the SADCC region means that it must be 
seen as of central economic and human concern. It is necessary to take its 
impact into account in all sectors - especially but not only in Mozambique and 
Angola - and to relate priorities in resource allocation to its reduction and 
alleviation.
Increasingly the independent Southern African states have understood and acted 
on this brutal reality both individually and collectively. National 
prioritisation of food security, rehabilitation and relief (emergencia), basic 
health care, restoration of regional transport routes and defence do speak to 
this as, perhaps slightly less directly, and to date less effectively, do 
attempts to increase intra regional trade, partially as a substitute for South 
Af rican.
The SADCC Programme of Action focusses squarely on the economic side of the 
price of Pretoria especially in its priorities for transport, power and 
telecommunications rehabilitation and expansion to break South Africa's 
non-military grip on the region. So too do SADCC's and the PTA's 
(Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa grouping 14 states 
including 6 SADCC members) on bolstering intra-regional trade as a means to 
re-sourcing imports and re-targetting exports away from RSA.
The Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) have increasingly coordinated regional defence and international 
diplomatic offensives against South Africa. The solidarity shown in the 
defence of Mozambique demonstrates the reality of that cooperation. So does 
the leadership they have taken in calling for effective international action -
-27-
especially sanctions - against South Africa to hasten the end of its regional 
policy of total aggression and of apartheid itself.
This external role of the FLS, like the resource mobilisation one of SADCC 
calls attention to the fact that by themselves the independent Southern 
African states cannot meet the costs of ending unilateral economic dependence 
on South Africa, blocking direct and proxy military aggression, sustaining 
existence and beginning rehabilitation for refugees and displaced persons, 
restoring growth and development. Poor and beset with most of the other 
exogenous shocks (including drought, debt and terms of trade) which have 
overwhelmed most of SSA since 1980 this is not surprising. They are - with 
the exception of Botswana - foreign exchange constrained, indeed in several 
cases import capacity strangled, economies. The annual foreign exchange cost 
of excess defence spending, higher cost transport routes, lost exports, 
survival relief and rehabilitation of direct war damage is - regionally - of 
the orri-r of three-quarters actual annual export earnings.
Regiona  ^ Costs: A Summary
The total regional cost of South African destabilisation and aggression is now 
running at about $10,000 million annually or of the order of 40% of achieved 
regional GDP. Over 1980-88 it totalled broadly of the order of $60,000 
million in 1988 prices or over twice present annual GDP and about three times 
gross external resource (grant, soft loan, export credit and commercial loan) 
inflows over the same period.
That cost was very unevenly distributed by country with Angola bearing the 
largest absolute burden - $4,500 million in 1988 and $27,000 to 30,000 million 
over 1980-88 - and Mozambique next with $2,500 to 3,000 million in 1980 and 
$15,000 million for the period. Between them the two lusophone states bore 70 
to 75$ of the GDP losses. However, no state escaped a significant loss, $30 
million for Lesotho and Swaziland being the lowest 1988, and $200 million for 
Swaziland the lowest 1980-88 estimates. Over the period six states had 
cumulative losses of over $1,000 million.
The current rate of losses also varied sharply as $ shares of achieved GDP 
from of the order of 100$ of actual GDP for Angola and Mozambique to 10$ or
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less for Botswana, Tanzania, Lesotho and Swaziland. However, even 5 to 10% of 
GDP must be seen as significant for a small, poor economy with narrow fiscal, 
forex, food security margins at macroeconomic level and with a majority of 
households with yet narrower margins of abject poverty and a very real danger 
of premature death.
The main elements in the losses were excess defence costs, loss of merchandise 
exports, excess transport costs on external trade and loss of transit traffic 
revenue. Loss of rural production and remittances had lesser macroeconomic 
impact albeit they were the most burdensome economic factors for poor 
households especially in Mozambique and Angola.
The losses suggest that in the absence of war the region's annual GDP growth
trend would have been of the order of 5% and perhaps 6% as opposed to 3% or 
less actually achieved over 1980-88. In the cases of Angola and Zimbabwe 
healthy per capita growth - up to 5% a year - could have been achieved and in 
the cases of Mozambique, Tanzania, probably Malawi and perhaps Zambia, GDP 
growth would have been able to be held at levels equal to or in excess of 
population growth.
Human costs are harder to summarise quantitatively. The most shocking is that 
for "excess mortality" - over 1,900,000 lives lost over 1980-88 as a direct or 
indirect consequence of South Africa's regional strategy. In Mozambique the 
total was of the order of 1,100,000 or nearly 8% of estimated 1988 population 
and in Angola 750,000 or 7.5%. The total for the rest of the region was much 
lower, perhaps 100,000.
The second indicator of human costs is displaced persons and refugees. Over 
half of the population of Angola and Mozambique - 14,000,000 - persons fell 
into this category. In addition Malawi's land access, food balance and 
ecology were hard pressed by the well over 500,000 Mozambicans (almost 7% of 
Malawi's national population) who had taken refuge there.
These totals are appalling - no milder term will do. They confirm the
hypothesis that in Angola, Mozambique and arguably Malawi and Zimbabwe, the
dominant cause of economic unsuccess and human misery in Southern Africa is 
South African destabilisation plus overt and proxy aggressions.
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VIII.
Tanzania: The 'Invisible' Burden
Tanzania is a good example of how little the costs of war are assessed in any 
depth and how brief passing references may conceal more than they reveal. 
Despite not infrequent mention in asides to the cost of the war following the 
Amin invasion of 1978, these are - with very rare exceptions - not seriously 
evaluated as a cause of post 1978 economic unsuccess. The costs of near 
perpetual preparedness for external war (invasion or incursion) since 1961 and 
of repeated acceptance of solidarity support costs for threatened neighbours 
have received even less attention.
The direct foreign exchange cost of war to Tanzania over 1960-88 of $1,425 
million suggests a direct non-military GDP loss of $7,000 million in prices of 
the year of loss. This is over $10,000 million in 1988 prices or about 224
months GDP. The additional military GDP - basically salaries and wages - can
hardly have been over $500 million and, while necessary, was not desired. 
Given the shock and policy lag results this is a minimum estimate and is in 
fact too low as it understates post-1982 GDP losses directly or indirectly 
related to previous war bills and to diversion of policy attention from 
economic strategy issues over a crucial period in 1978-79.
Alternatively one could assume in the absence of the Amin war and its 
aftermath and the 1986-88 Mozambique solidarity exercise:
a. development of a crisis management strategy (including parastatal reform 
and tightened fiscal policy) by the first quarter of 1979;
b. successful negotiation of a programme loan package with the World Bank 
and consequential programmes with bilateral sources by the end of 1979;
c. more as a condition for "b" than as a source of finance, an IMF agreement
going marginally into the second credit tranche by mid-1979;
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d. adoption of an inflation offsetting, frequent, marginal exchange rate 
adjustment policy (and a basket not overloaded in 'favour' of the USA 
dollar) by the end of 1980 when the trend appreciation of the dollar had 
become clear;
e. averting or continuing the arrears and supplier credit overhang buildup.
On that basis instead of declining by a total of 4 to 5$ from 1978 through
1982 constant price GDP might have stagnated in 1979 and risen on average 2 to
2 \% a year over 1980-82 for a counterfactual 1982 GDP 10 to 12j$ above that 
actually attained. Instead of growing a total of 5$ over 19 8 3-8 5 and about 4 
in 1986 GDP after 1982 (despite external environmental problems) could 
probably have risen 3s to 4$ a year. In that event 1986 GDP would have been 
of the order of 20$ above actual and 25$ (vs 5$ actual) above 1978 more or 
less parallelling population growth. The cumulative GDP loss on this basis 
over 1979-86 was of the order of $6,000 million in 1985 prices. However, that 
is an interim figure because no matter how rapid 1987-90 recovery is, it can 
hardly make good a 20$ starting loss of output and because the counterfactual 
implies about $2,000 million less external debt and a $200 million higher 
export base than the projected actual. These estimates exclude all pre-1978 
costs.
Over 19 8 7-8 8 GDP growth has been of the order of 4$. On a counterfactual
basis that suggests a further loss of $320 million versus 6$ growth on the 
higher 1986 counterfactual basis. On the basis of a forex cost of $275
million, $100 million used to avert reappearance of current arrears and of
non-fulfillment of debt rescheduling provisions and $150 million to provide 
increased operating input and transport imports (two clear constraints to
recovery) the current output cost can be estimated at $750 million. That 
would imply that a short term initial recovery growth rate of 8$ to 9$ would 
have been possible except for raw material, spare parts and lorry constraints 
- an inherently plausible estimate.
Even though Tanzania has not had a civil war nor fought a major war on its own 
soil, the direct and indirect impact of war since 1978 has been "killing the 
dream". As of 1978 universal access to basic education, health, pure water, 
125-150 infant and under 5 mortality rates, 60 year life expectancy,
elimination of severe malnutrition and reduction of the proportion of
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Tanzanians living in absolute poverty to under one quarter were reasonable 
dreams and basic national goals backed by priority allocation of resources. 
In 1986 Tanzania is further from achieving them than in 1978 even though they 
remain objectives and still have priority (albeit a priority eroded by war and 
debt service bills) in allocating a shrunken total of resources. Certainly 
external environmental hostility (terms of trade and drought) and domestic 
economic management sloppiness (partly itself the result of too sharply
increased a level of challenges) played a part, but without the costs of the
Amin war the 1978-86 direction of change could still have been upward and
without the need to support Mozambique and defend the Ruvuma border the 
1987-88 recovery could probably have been twice as high in absolute and four 
to five times as rapid in per capita terms.
IX.
Can A War Be Fought On A Balanced Budget?
Zimbabwe is usually perceived as having a reckless fiscal policy with the
government finance requirement in excess of 10% of GDP. The statistics are 
valid, the inferred cause is inaccurate.
In the absence of excess military spending, excess transport costs (via RSA 
because of damage to Mozambican routes) and dutiable import/sales taxable 
output constrictions from the need to finance military forex costs Zimbabwe's 
domestic borrowing requirement (on combined recurrent and capital accounts) 
would be negative. Taken together with a currency which is undervalued in 
comparative price shift terms and a recurrent external account surplus 
(including both interest on external debt which is fully paid and grant aid 
which is relatively small) this suggests not a reckless but an austere fiscal 
and macroeconomic policy. Indeed it might be argued that fiscal and forex 
rectitude have been carried too far - more external borrowing and somewhat 
higher domestic expenditure financed by taxes on the additional imports (and 
goods made from them) financed by that borrowing might be more prudent.
Clearly war is a fact and positing a normal non-war domestic borrowing 
requirement (which would clearly not be zero in Zimbabwe) and adding on war 
bills would not be prudent. But modern wars are not fought with current
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account - fiscal or foreign - surpluses nor is it normally argued that they 
should be. Until Zimbabwe economic analysis, planning and macroeconomic 
policy formulation includes estimation of articulated war costs, it is hard to 
see how a rational process of 'optimum borrowing requirement' estimation can 
be carried out. The World Bank and IMF have quite simply ignored war bills in 
their macroeconomic analysis of, and prescription preaching to, Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe itself has made no formal attempt to include it in the quantitative 
model coordinated planning process, in Budget Speech highlighting of key 
issues nor in annual economic surveys. Drought and open-ended subsidies do 
receive much more attention both as to analysis and as to what policy measures 
would limit costs and damages without creating unbearable new social burdens 
or economic costs. Why? Zimbabwe is quite open in citing the war burden and 
verbally describing its severe economic consequences. Why the lack of 
quantification, analysis and explicit consideration in overall economic policy 
f ormulation?
War Plus Drought Equals Death: Not Drought Alone
In post 1980 SSA it is possible to identify a very high correlation between 
severe loss of life from drought and war. It is not accidental that the cases 
of killing famine - as opposed to severe malnutrition with famine barely 
averted - since 1978 are Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda 
and Chad. In each case civil war and/or external aggression has had three 
impacts: first, it lowered production through rural population displacement 
and damage to transport even in the absence of drought; second, it reduced
government ability to finance food imports and/or distribution and third, it
physically (and politically) impeded distribution of externally financed 
relief supplies.
This killing interaction remains. Over the 1988/89 main harvests' key 
germination and growing periods weather in most of SSA has been favourable. 
Larger harvests and reduced food aid needs for 1989 are projected. But there 
are five exceptions: Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique and Sudan. 
All except Malawi are cases of massive war dislocation of people and of
transport. Malawi hosts up to 600,000 Mozambican refugees and has its economy
(and transport links for - inter alia - relief food imports) devastated by the 
South African proxy forces. Mass rural terrorism in Mozambique and sabotage
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of Malawi's logical rail routes to the sea and land routes to Zimbabwe via 
Mozambique - i.e. war - are at the route of its food security crisis.
The policy implications are in part clear albeit how to act on some of them is 
not:
a. war afflicted countries need massive emergency programmes to avert mass 
starvation, e.g. $400 million including 800,000 tonnes of food for the 
1988/89 Mozambique Emergencia operation;
b. these may need to go beyond food to logistics (including transport 
equipment and repairs) and inputs/seeds/basic services for 
re-establishing rural life and production - areas notoriously 
underfinanced in emergency operations;
c. and may need to go further to provide the means to defend relief convoys 
(which are prime targets in Angola, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Mozambique, the 
Sudan and en route to Malawi);
d. the politics of denial of food aid domestically (Ethiopia/Eritrea and the 
Sudan on both sides of each conflict) and internationally (non-funding of 
Angola Emergencia operations at levels even remotely resembling needs or 
support to Mozambique) need to be faced openly and to be combatted.
X.
Economic And Military Strategic Interactions
A further issue which is rarely pursued in any detail is the interaction 
between the military strategies and praxis of a state and its economic 
strategies and praxis. What discussion there is tends to be at the very 
general level of budgetary and forex spending (and skilled personpower 
allocation) to the military reducing that available for fixed investment, 
maintenance and use of present capacity/provision of civil public services. 
While valid these points - especially without quantification of even the 
orders of magnitude involved do not take one very far.
-34-
Tradeoffs, whether sectoral or new fixed investment - maintenance - recurrent 
services - enterprise/household sector production, are not in practice 
handleable by precise marginal cost benefit analysis. However, if orders of 
magnitude are set out and simple projections of probable results with 
alternative allocations made the decision making process is likely to be more 
informed than if no rough tradeoff calculations at all are made.
Within the military sector both expertise limitations and security
considerations limit outside economic analysis of cost/benefit and tradeoff 
ratios. However, the questions economists can usefully pose (for debate 
within the security professional group and political decision taking organs) 
need not be negligible in focussing attention and improving decisions:
a. what are the strategic objectives on the security front?
b. how do these benefit the economy to the extent they are achieved?
c. within a given defence budget what mix of instruments (e.g. infantry,
mobility enhancing vehicles, artillery, armour, helicopters, jet
aircraft) is financially possible and most likely to achieve minimum 
acceptable results (or better) on each stategic goal?
d. in respect to major choices (e.g. 50 helicopters including 15 gunships 
versus 6 front line jet fighters - about the same as to capital and
operating costs) what are the relative security gain/cost ratios?
There is also a much more concrete level of interaction. If economic and 
military strategies are carried out in parallel without cross coordination the 
results are likely to be sub-optimal on both fronts. This can be illustrated 
in the case of Mozambique.
Four strategic economic objectives are:
a. seeing that emergencia programme food, basic services and rehabilitation 
inputs are delivered;
b. restoring rural livelihood and effective provisioning of cities from 
domestic production;
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c. reopening key domestic and transit transport routes;
d. completing or rehabilitating major economic units whose completion or 
operation has been largely or wholly halted by the war (e.g. cement 
factories, coal mines, textile complex in Zambesia province);
e. raising exports to increase earned, freely useable import capacity.
In each case military protection - for convoys, for villages (whether 
traditional or resettlement), for schools and hospitals, for main transport 
routes and economic installations - is a necessary condition. For example, 
one cement plant has been largely idled because while the plant was protected 
and the route to the quarry passable, the quarry itself was not adequately 
guarded to avert destruction of key machinery and installations. It is most 
unlikely that such protection will be available unless the military decision 
takers have specific prior knowledge of the what, where and when of economic 
strategy.
Similarly the resources available for defence and the balance between defence 
and breaking armed bandit units and clearing areas of their remnants have real 
resource and technical/military constraints. And there are logics of what, 
where and when from a military point of view which may or may not be fully 
compatible with protection of particular economic initiatives.
Three points emerge: if an economic initiative cannot be defended it is a 
waste of resources to attempt it; if a particular installation or project is 
economically vital it must be defended; determining how these conditions can 
be met requires detailed economic-military dialogue on what can be done in 
what places in what time frame/sequence.
Prior to 1985 there is evidence that economic and military strategy and 
phasing were drawn up in parallel with very limited coordination. As a direct 
result very substantial investments were made which proved nugatory because 
not defended (or defensible) and not inconsiderable capacity which might have 
been kept in operation was idled because specific arrangements for its defence 
were not made. Since 1986 it appears that substantially more coordination has 
been achieved.
At a more general level it is frequently argued that war causes shifts in 
political economic strategy whether to or away from greater openness and 
market orientation. Or both - arguably a war economy might give priority to 
virtually material balances planning of certain key sectors and units 
(including but not limited to the military) and allow laissez faire or an 
approximation thereto in the rest of the economy.
Four patterns seem to be identifiable in SSA:
a. complete or near complete collapse of effective economic strategy and of
praxis beyond day to day crisis coping as as result of economic and
political overload caused by war, e.g. Sudan in recent years;
b. concentration of state activity on a narrow range of activities 
(excluding many of the key productive sectors and units) with very 
considerable de facto (and sometimes de jure) freedom to manoeuvre for 
private, household or effectively autonomous public enterprises - e.g. 
Uganda from 1979;
c. an evolution toward "war communism" in the defence, key export and 
selected key economic unit sectors with a somewhat indifferent tolerance 
toward enterprise and household initiatives in other areas or melding
both with elements of a neo-Leninite "New Economic Policy" - e.g. Angola 
over 1980-88;
d. attempts toward an emergencia/economic rehabilitation/basic 
services/defence economic focus overlapping with selective joint venture, 
selective liberalisation and private enterprise encouragement (perhaps a 
more full blown African NEP variant) - e.g. Mozambique since 1986.
Which tendencies are likely to be dominant under what conditions and in what 
political economic contexts is an area on which little research or even 
informed speculation has taken place.
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XI.
War and Neo-Liberal Economies: What Linkages?
One direct implication of the neo-liberal economic approach is that, by 
keeping war outside the framework of economic analysis, it is almost certain 
to reduce efficiency of resource allocation in a war context. However, as 
noted earlier, this is by no means unique to that economic ideology/paradigm.
A central question is whether neo-liberalism in economics causes or 
exacerbates (or removes or ameliorates) contexts giving rise to wars. In SSA 
there is little evidence of correlation - positive or negative. The Chadian, 
Saourian and Horn conflicts long pre-date the rise of neo-liberalism or the 
launching of its African flotilla flagship, the Berg Report. The Southern 
African conflicts do parallel the rise of neo-liberalism in that they were 
greatly stepped up from 1981 - albeit earlier phases dated back to the 1960s. 
However, the driving force for war - South Africa's total regional strategy - 
is very clearly not a product of neo-liberal economics and to the extent it is 
economically motivated bears a family relationship to Hjalmar Schacht's 1930s 
policies in Nazi Germany not to Chicago School models.
So too with declines in levels of war. Military defeat and lives lost
(perhaps reinforced by recession and defence budget burdens) explain South 
Africa's evacuation of Angola and potential ending of the occupation of 
Namibia. Military reverses on the Eritrean and Tigrean fronts, not economic 
policy rethinking and probably not even the continuing economic stagnation, 
led to Ethiopia's 1988 moves to reduce actual and perceived probable
hostilities levels vis a vis Somalia and Ethiopia. The Sudan's renewed - but 
very problematic - quest for an end to civil war by negotiation turns on 
human and social costs and exhaustion rather more than on direct economic 
condition causes and certainly has no direct link to economic strategy
reformulation (if any).
There are in certain contexts direct links from policies and actions flowing 
from economic neo-liberal perspectives and pressures to civil disorder and 
short term violence. Zambia's 1986 maize meal price riots and the 1985
Sudanese bread price riots leading to the overthrow of the el Nimeiry regime 
are examples as are the 1989 Sudan food price riots which greatly weakened the
el Mahdi government. However, neither was a war as defined here . The Zambian 
case was a brief period of massive (but geographically limited) civil disorder 
which was rapidly contained and partly defused by policy reversals. The first 
Sudanese case did lead to a change in government but neither to a Northern 
civil war nor to a solution to the Northern/Southern civil war while the 
second has weakened both the political system in the North and the Khartoum 
government stability needed for a North-South settlement without directly 
leading either to a change of government, a coup or sustained intra-Northern 
violence.
Even at civil disorder level two problems arise. The same type of measure -
e.g. food subsidy reduction or abolition - is accepted in one country and 
leads to riots in another (vide Tanzania 1984 and Zambia 1986). Or, e.g., 
massive accepted petroleum price increases in Ghana over 19 8 3 -8 5 and riots 
over a 3% increase in Nigeria in 1988. The differences seem to turn on
general public perceptions of the state and its goals and/or competence, not 
on either the specific measures or whether they are taken in a war context. 
Further, all of the above initiatives could be justified on grounds other than 
neo-liberal economics. (The Tanzanian one was in fact decided and defended on 
a quite different rationale.) The difference in reaction may relate to 
perceptions of unwelcome external imposition rather than to views on 
neo-liberal economics or even the specific changes as such.
XII.
Preliminary Summary
a. Neo-liberalism calls for a small, nightwatchman state but provides little 
guidance as to priorities, levels or output/cost ratio (productivity) 
improvements in state spending;
b. nor does it treat war as a major macroeconomic parameter needing to be 
disarticulated sectorally and factored into analysis, evaluation and 
proposals;
c. this is a major failing in SSA and especially in over a dozen severely 
war affected states with populations approaching 250 million;
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d. it is exacerbated by failure to coordinate articulated economic policy 
and projects as to what, where and when with their military counterparts;
e. however, there is no very plausible evidence in SSA that neo-liberalism 
(whether practised or rejected) and war (whether heightened or reduced) 
have either substantial causal or empirical links (in either direction). 
While severe war costs do tend to force changing national macro political 
economic strategies the changes are by no means uniformly toward freeing 
market forces and, in any event, leave the presumptive priority tasks - 
waging and ending the wars - squarely in the state sector. (So far as 
the author is aware setting up an accountable, autonomous, self-financing 
parastatal in a goal specified contractual relation to the state to fight 
a war is a proposal which has not been made much less acted upon, unless 
one sees the RSA proxy forces in that light which would appear to be a 
slightly eccentric reading.) Massive opening up to the private sector, 
"war communism" and a mix of more limited but more intensive intervention 
using more market management and less administrative instruments have all 
been resorted to in SSA cases national economic implosion caused by war. 
Only the last choice seems to be likely to survive the ending of war 
imposed economic constraints.
Source Note
As indicated the topic of this paper is not one with a large bibliography
either in neo-liberal economic theory or in respect to Sub-Saharan Africa. 
There is a literature on the military and one on wars but not on the
articulated macroeconomic costs and consequences of war. With the exception 
of Southern Africa the main sources are scattered (very) references in World 
Bank country and sectoral documents, only slightly less scanty coverage in 
national policy statements and speeches and interviews. For Southern Africa 
the foregoing sources are somewhat more extensive and six studies exist:
a. UNICEF, Children On The Front Line, New York, 1987
b. _____ , Children On The Front Line, revised and expanded to include
Namibia, New York, 1989
c. SADCC, Overview (Annex on Costs of South African Aggression) for 1985
Mbabane SADCC, Gaborone, 1985
d. Green, R. H. and C. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict" in D.
Martin and P. Johnson Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa At 
War, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986, updated version Four 
Walls Eight Windows, New York, 1988
e. Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours, Catholic Institute for International
Relations - James Curry, London, 1988
f. UN Economic Commission for Africa, 1988 (to date unpublished) consultants
study on "The Price of Pretoria".
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